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Abstract—We consider training machine learning models using data located on multiple private and geographically-scattered servers
with different privacy settings. Due to the distributed nature of the data, communicating with all collaborating private data owners
simultaneously may prove challenging or altogether impossible. We consider differentially-private asynchronous algorithms for
collaboratively training machine-learning models on multiple private datasets. The asynchronous nature of the algorithms implies that a
central learner interacts with the private data owners one-on-one whenever they are available for communication without needing to
aggregate query responses to construct gradients of the entire fitness function. Therefore, the algorithm efficiently scales to many data
owners. We define the cost of privacy as the difference between the fitness of a privacy-preserving machine-learning model and the
fitness of trained machine-learning model in the absence of privacy concerns. We demonstrate that the cost of privacy has an upper
bound that is inversely proportional to the combined size of the training datasets squared and the sum of the privacy budgets squared.
We validate the theoretical results with experiments on financial and medical datasets. The experiments illustrate that collaboration
among more than 10 data owners with at least 10,000 records with privacy budgets greater than or equal to 1 results in a superior
machine-learning model in comparison to a model trained in isolation on only one of the datasets, illustrating the value of collaboration
and the cost of the privacy. The number of the collaborating datasets can be lowered if the privacy budget is higher.
Index Terms—Machine learning; Differential privacy; Stochastic gradient algorithm; Asynchronous.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
UNPRECEDENTED abundance of data has ignited a ma-chine learning (ML) race that aims to boost productiv-
ity and spur economic growth globally. However, the data
required for training such ML models is often distributed
across multiple independent competing entities, e.g., finan-
cial or energy data is often scattered across servers for sev-
eral service providers with competing interests. Regulatory
frameworks, such as the GDPR, are increasingly restrict-
ing migration of private data across companies or even
geographical boundaries for possible merger and training.
This might restrict ML techniques from accessing the data
in its entirety for training models, which motivates the
development of distributed ML techniques with privacy
guarantees.
Training data for machine learning can be located on
multiple private geographically-scattered servers with dif-
ferent privacy settings. For instance, the training data can
be gathered by Internet of Things (IoT) devices or hosted
locally on smart devices with privacy settings enforced by
users. Another example is cross-sector or -services ML with
cross-governance datasets. In these cases, communicating
with all private data owners simultaneously when training
ML models is unpractical, if not impossible. A learner (i.e.,
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a central agent responsible for training ML models) needs
to resort to asynchronous communication with the different
data owners. This implies that the learner can communicate
with the data owners on a one-on-one basis without needing
to wait for all data owners to respond. When using a
gradient descent algorithm for training the ML model, the
asynchronous communication raises an important challenge:
the learner no longer knows the direction for the best model
update based on all the training dataset; it can only infer the
best update direction for the communicating data owner.
In this paper, we investigate the fitness of asynchronous
ML learning algorithms. The learner updates the model
based on differentially-private (DP) [1], [2] gradient of only
the part of the fitness that depends on the data possessed by
the communicating data owner. To address the challenge
of not knowing the direction for the best model update,
the learner updates the ML model with small, yet constant,
learning rates. The learner also shows inertia in updating its
ML model so that it does not change the model significantly
because of the gradient of just one data owner. These choices
are motivated by that the learner is not overly confident
that an update that is good for one data owner is also good
for the others. The constant learning rate and the inertia of
the learner allow the gradients of all the data owners to
get mixed with across time so that the learner follows the
direction for the best model update.
Note that, in this paper, we only investigate honest-but-
curious threats in which the data owners do not trust the
learner or each other for sharing private datasets while they
trust that the learner trains the model correctly based on
a specified algorithm. For instance, in a financial sector, a
central bank or a government organisation may be trusted
for training ML models from distributed datasets but finan-
cial organisations prefer not to share their original data with
2the bank nor with each other. Likewise, in the health sector,
a government organisation may be trusted to play the role
of the central learner. For more general settings, incentives
must be provided to ensure that the learner follows the
training algorithm [3], [4].
The difference between the fitness function evaluated
for privacy-preserving ML model and the fitness function
evaluated for trained ML model without privacy concerns,
or the degradation caused in the performance of ML mod-
els by the presence of differential privacy noise, captures
the cost of privacy. In this paper, we prove that the cost
of privacy is inversely proportional to the combined size
of the training datasets squared and the privacy budgets
squared. We validate the theoretical results on experiments
on financial data. We use linear regression on a dataset
of loan information from the Lending Club, a peer-to-peer
lending platform, for setting interest rates of loans based
on attributes, such as loan size and credit rating. We also
use regression models on a dataset of hospital visits by
patients in the U.S for determining the length of stay based
on attributes, such as age, gender, and diagnosis. We show
that, for collaboration among large numbers of private
data owners, i.e., more than 10 data owners with at least
10,000 records, and with relatively large privacy budgets,
i.e., privacy budgets greater than 1, the performance of the
private ML model can beat the performance of a model that
is trained with no collaboration. Therefore, we establish the
value of collaboration in ML between multiple private data
owners.
2 RELATED WORK
ML with Differential Privacy: Previous work [5]–[9] stud-
ied ML training under the differential privacy framework.
These approaches require merging the private datasets for
training and rely on obfuscating the generated ML model
using DP once the training on the aggregated data is per-
formed. Alternatively, an ML model based on the obfus-
cated, yet merged data is trained. These studies do not
consider the need for privacy preservation prior to merging
the data. In addition they do not consider the asynchronous
nature of the communication between the learner and the data
owners by only requiring responses to some queries on the
private dataset.
Distributed/Collaborative Privacy-Preserving ML:
Distributed privacy-preserving ML proposes the use
of DP gradients for training ML models [10]–[19]. Noisy
DP gradients can be used to train ML models with convex
and non-convex fitness functions [14]–[16]. An important
aspect of these studies is that they sometimes use better
DP composition methods, such as moment accountant,
for reducing the scale of the DP noise [12]. These studies
however propose synchronous updates in which the ML model
must be updated according to the contributions of all
the data owners simultaneously (rather than a subset of
them). This assumption can prohibit the use of the above
distributed or collaborative ML training algorithms in
the presence of numerous data owners. They also do not
provide a forecast for the performance of privacy-preserving
trained models. Note that this paper addresses a similar
problem to [14] but under an asynchronous model by
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Fig. 1. Communication structure between a central learner and multiple
data owners with private datasets.
allowing the learner to communicate with the datasets
in a one-on-one basis whenever they are available. The
availability for communication is particularly modelled
using Poisson point processes. These processes are often
utilized for analysis of asynchronous multi-agent systems
and are shown to mimic practical scenarios [20]–[22].
Asynchronous Distributed Optimization and ML: Dis-
tributed asynchronous optimization algorithms can be used
for training ML models [20], [23]–[27]. This is because
we can formulate distributed ML training as a distributed
optimization problem with private datasets represented as
parts of the fitness function. These algorithms are however
generic and do not address the issue of selecting learning
rate for ML training with DP gradients and forecasting the
quality of the trained ML model based on dataset sizes and
privacy budgets. Forecasting the performance of privacy-
preserving ML algorithms can be used to understand the
value of collaboration between distributed private datasets.
Without such forecasts the private data owners might need
to forgo their private datasets so that a trusted third-party
can compare the performance of the private ML model
with the ML model trained in absence of privacy concerns
(as otherwise there is no ground truth for comparison in
general). Asynchronous optimization has been also utilized
in the past for ML purposes; see, e.g., [28]–[30]. These
studies however do not consider additive DP noises and
their impact on quality of trained ML models.
3 ASYNCHRONOUS ML TRAINING WITH DP
We consider N ∈ N private data owners connected to a
central learning node, referred to as learner, responsible for
training a ML model.
Figure 1 depicts the communication structure between
the learner and the private data owners. The set of data
owners is denoted by N := {1, . . . , N}. The data owners
possess a private training dataset composed of inputs xi and
outputs yi. The dataset is denoted by Di := {(xi, yi)}nii=1 ⊆
X× Y ⊆ Rpx × Rpy .
Informally, an ML model is a meaningful relationship
between inputs and outputs in a training dataset. The ML
model is M(·; θ) for some mapping M : X × Rpθ → Y with
3θ ∈ Rpθ denoting the parameters of the ML model. The
learner in Figure 1 aims to train the ML modelM(·; θ) based
on the available training datasets Di, ∀i ∈ N , by solving the
optimization problem in
θ∗ ∈ argmin
θ∈Θ
f(θ), (1)
where Θ := {θ ∈ Rpθ | ‖θ‖∞ ≤ θmax} and f : Rpθ → R
is the fitness for ML model parameter θ, i.e., the fitness of
ML model M(·; θ) for relating the inputs and outputs in the
training dataset ∪j∈NDj , given by
f(θ) :=g(θ) +
1
n
∑
{x,y}∈
⋃
j∈N Dj
ℓ(M(x; θ), y). (2)
In the fitness (2), g(θ) is a regularizing term, ℓ(M(x; θ), y)
is a loss function capturing the distance between the output
of the ML model M(x; θ) and the true output y, and n =∑
j∈N nj . Finally, note that we can select a large enough
θmax so that, if desired, training on Θ does not add any
conservatism (in comparison to the unconstrained case).
In what follows, we present our ML learning algorithm
for solving (1). To do so, the learner must update the ML
model based on the gradient of the fitness function (2).
Noting that the learner might not have the communication
and computational capacities required to interact with all
the data owners at the same time, we consider the design
constraint of having an asynchronous interaction between
the data owners and the learner. The asynchronous setup
implies that the learner can only communicate with one of
the data owners at each given iteration and thus can only
access the gradient of the part of the fitness that depends on
the data possessed by the communicating data owner. This
makes the task of updating the ML model challenging as
the learner would not know the direction for the best model
update. In fact, an update direction that is good for one data
owner might not be good for all the others. To alleviate this
problem, the learner updates the ML model with small, yet
constant, learning rates. It also shows inertia in updating
the ML model to avoid significant changes because of the
gradient of just one data owner. The constant learning rate
and the inertia of the learner allow the gradients of all
the data owners to get mixed with across time so that the
learner follows the direction for the best model update. In
the remainder of this section, we clarify all the steps in the
algorithm.
Wemodel the internal clock of the data owner by Poisson
point processes with rates of one. These clocks are not in any
form synchronized and equal rate (of one) for the clocks
simply implies that the data owners communicate with
the learner with equal probability (not at equal times). At
random times, the Poisson processes instigate communica-
tion between the data owners and the learner on a one-on-
one basis. The Poisson process model is often utilized for
analysis of asynchronous multi-agent systems [20]–[22]. Let
the time instants in which the data owners communicate
with the learner be given by
0 = t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tk ≤ · · · ≤ tT .
At each time instant tk, k ∈ N, one the data owners at
random communicates with the learner. We use the notation
ik ∈ N to denote the index of that data owner that is
communicating with the learner at time instance tk.
Two approaches can be utilized in the asynchronous
communication. One approach is broadcasting by the
learner. In this scenario, the learner, in regular time inter-
vals, broadcasts gradient queries to all data owners (some
might be listening while others not). Whenever one of the
data owners responds, the index k is incremented. Let tk
denote the time at which the communication takes place
and ik denote the index of the communicating data owner.
Another approach is requesting for update by the data
owner. In this scenario, the leaner is constantly listening
for requests of update. Whenever a data owner submits a
request, the index k is incremented with tk denoting the
time and ik denoting the index of the data owner. At this
point, the learner only communicates with that data owner
until the update is over.
At each iteration, the learner submits a gradient query of
the form
Qik(Dik ; θ) :=
1
nik
∑
{x,y}∈Dik
∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y) ∈ Q (3)
to the communicating data owner ik ∈ N . Here, Q is the
output space of the queries. The communicating data owner
ik ∈ N provides the DP response
Qik(Dik ; θ) = Qik(Dik ; θ) + wik(k) (4)
to the gradient query Qik(Dik ; θ). Here, wik(k) is a privacy-
preserving additive noise to ensure DP.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). Responses of data owner
ℓ ∈ N are ǫℓ-differentially private (or ǫℓ-DP) over the horizon T
if
P
{
(Qℓ(Dℓ; k))k:ik=ℓ ∈ Y
}
≤ exp(ǫℓ)P
{
(Qℓ(D′ℓ; k))k:ik=ℓ ∈ Y
}
,
where Y is any Borel-measurable subset of Q|{k:ik=ℓ}|, and Dℓ
and D′ℓ are two adjacent datasets differing at most in one entry,
i.e., |Dℓ \ D′ℓ| = |D′ℓ \ Dℓ| ≤ 1.
We make the following standing assumptions through-
out the paper for the purpose of theoretical analysis.
Assumption 1. g(θ) is σ strongly convex in θ and ℓ(M(x; θ), y)
is convex in θ.
Assumption 2. The following properties hold:
1) Ξg := supθ∈Θ ‖∇θg(θ)‖2 <∞;
2) Ξ := supθ∈Θ sup(x,y)∈X×Y ‖∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y)‖2 <∞.
Assumption 3. T ∈ N is the maximum number of iterations for
communication between data owners and learner.
Theorem 1. The policy of data owners in line 6 of Algorithm 1
for responding to the queries over the horizon {1, . . . , T } is ǫi-
DP, ∀i ∈ N , if wi(k) are statistically independent Laplace noises
with scale 2ΞT/(niǫi).
Proof. Due to space constraints, the proofs are presented as
supplementary material.
4Algorithm 1Asynchronous ML learning using DP gradients
for strongly-convex smooth fitness cost.
Require: T ∈ N, ρ ∈ R≥0
Ensure: (θ1,k, θ2,k, . . . , θN,k, θL,k)
T
k=1
1: Learner: Initialize θ1,0 = · · · = θN,0 = θL,0 = 0
2: for k = 1, . . . , T do
3: Randomly at uniform select data owner ik
4: Learner: Compute θ¯k according to (6)
5: Learner: Submit gradient query Qik(Dik ; θ¯k) to data
owner ik according to (3)
6: Data owner ik: Provide DP response according to (4)
7: Learner: Update ML models according to (5) and (7)
8: end for
We consider an approach in which the leaner keeps track
of a central ML model, i.e., θL,k, and N copies of it for each
data owners, i.e., θi,k for each i = 1, . . . , N . This is moti-
vated by the algorithm in [24] that forms the basis of our
ML training algorithm. The local copies are only updated
when the corresponding data owner is communicating with
the learner. This is to keep track of the updates for each data
owner. The update for the local ML model is given by
θik,k =ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − Nρ
T 2σ
(
1
2N
∇θg(θ¯k)
+
nik
n
Qik(Dik ; θ¯k)
)]
, (5)
where
θ¯k =
1
2
(θL,k−1 + θik,k−1). (6)
Note that the learner updates the ML model with small, yet
constant, learning rates. The learner also shows inertia in
updating the central ML model so that it does not change
the model significantly because of the gradient of just one
data owner. The update for the central ML model is given
by
θL,k =ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − (N − 1)ρ
NT 2σ
∇θg(θ¯k)
]
. (7)
The constant learning rate and the inertia of the learner
allow the gradients of all the data owners to get mixed with
each other across time so that the learner follow the direction
for the best model update. All the steps of the learner and
the data owners for generating queries, responding to the
queries, and using the DP responses for updating the ML
model are summarized in Algorithm 1. Finally, note that
in step 3 of Algorithm 1 it states that the data owners are
selected uniformly at random. This is compatible with the
Poisson process clocks. The first data owner whose Poisson
clock ticks communicates with the learner and because of
the symmetry this happens with equal probability between
the data owners (hence, in each iteration, one of the agents
with uniform probability communicates with the learner).
4 PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE ML MODELS
For Algorithm 1, we can prove the following convergence re-
sult under the assumptions of strong convexity and smooth-
ness of the ML fitness function.
Theorem 2. For any N , there exist constants1 c1, c2, c
′
1, c
′
2 > 0
such that the iterates of Algorithm 1 satisfy
E{‖θL,T − θ∗‖22}≤c1
√√√√ 1
T 2
+N
∑
i∈N
(
1
T
+
2
√
2
nǫi
)2
+c2

 1
T 2
+N
∑
i∈N
(
1
T
+
2
√
2
nǫi
)2. (8)
and
E{f(θL,T )}−f(θ∗)≤c′1
√√√√ 1
T 2
+N
∑
i∈N
(
1
T
+
2
√
2
nǫi
)2
+c′2

 1
T 2
+N
∑
i∈N
(
1
T
+
2
√
2
nǫi
)2. (9)
Proof. Due to space constraints, the proofs are presented as
supplementary material.
For large enough learning horizon T , the upper
bound (8) takes the form of
E{‖θL,T − θ∗‖22} ≤
c¯1
n
√∑
i∈N
1
ǫ2i
+
c¯2
n2
(∑
i∈N
1
ǫ2i
)
, (10)
where c¯1 =
√
8Nc1 and c¯2 = 8Nc2. Similarly, for large T ,
the upper bound (8) takes the form of
E{f(θL,T )}−f(θ∗) ≤ c¯
′
1
n
√∑
i∈N
1
ǫ2i
+
c¯′2
n2
(∑
i∈N
1
ǫ2i
)
, (11)
where again c¯′1 =
√
8Nc′1 and c¯
′
2 = 8Nc
′
2. This takes the
form of the performance bound in [14]. Under the assump-
tion that all the data owners have equal privacy budgets
ǫi = ǫ, ∀i, the bound in (11) scales as ǫ−2. This bound
matches the lower and upper bounds in [31] for strongly
convex loss functions. The same outcome also holds ifN = 1
and ǫ1 = ǫ which captures centralized privacy-preserving
learning.
We can introduce the cost of privacy (CoP) as the
difference of the fitness for privacy-preserving ML model
and the fitness for trained ML model in the absence of
privacy concerns. The inequalities in (10) and (11) show
that CoP is inversely proportional to the combined size of
the training datasets squared and the sum of the privacy
budgets squared.
5 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section, we investigate the performance of Algo-
rithm 1 on real datasets from the financial and health
domains. In our experiments, the datasets have significantly
different sizes and the size of the training datasets influence
the performance of both non-private and privateMLmodels.
Hence, we factor out the effects of the size of the training
datasets on the performance of the learning by only consid-
ering the relative fitness, defined as ψ(θ) := f(θ)/f(θ∗)− 1.
This measure captures the quality of any ML model θ in
comparison to the non-private ML model θ∗ in terms of the
1. See the proof of the theorem in the supplementary materials for
the exact constants.
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Fig. 2. Percentile statistics of relative fitness of 100 runs of Algorithm 1
for learning lending-interest-rates versus the iteration number k for a
learning horizon of T = 1, 000 iterations with three choices of privacy
budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. The gray area illustrates the range of 25% to
75% percentiles and the black line shows the median of relative fitness.
fitness in (2). By definition, ψ(θ) ≥ 0 for any ML model θ.
The larger ψ(θ), the worse the performance of ML model θ
in comparison with the non-private ML model θ∗.
Datasets and codes for developing the experimental
results reported in this paper are available in an online Git
repository [32].
5.1 Lending Dataset (Financial)
We first train a linear regression model on lending datasets
as an example of automating banking processes requiring
access to sensitive private datasets.
5.1.1 Dataset Description and Pre-Processing
We use a dataset of anonymized loan application infor-
mation from roughly 890,000 individuals [33]. We remove
unique identifiers, such as id and member id, and irrelevant
attributes, such as URL addresses. We endeavour to train
a linear regression model on this dataset. The input to the
regression model are loan information, such as loan size,
and applicant information, such as credit rating, state of
residence and age. The model estimates the annual interest
rate for the loans. We encode categorical attributes, such as
state of residence and loan grade, with integer numbers.
In order to improve the numerical stability of the al-
gorithm, we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
perform feature selection. We select the top ten important
features. For this step, we only use the last ten-thousand
entries of the dataset. We can assume that these entries are
known to the learner and thus do not violate the distributed
nature of the algorithm. This would have been a restrictive
assumption if the learner used the entire dataset for the PCA
(because the data owners must have agreed to perform PCA
in collaboration without privacy concerns, which is contra-
diction with their original interest for privacy-preserving
ML). Using the PCA, the learner can construct a dictionary
for feature selection and communicate it to private data
owners.
5.1.2 Experiment Setup and Results
We start with an experiment evaluating the outcome of
collaborations between N = 3 banks. We use the linear
regression model y = M(x; θ) := θ⊤x with θ denoting
the model parameters. The fitness function is given by
g2(M(x; θ), y) = ‖y−M(x; θ)‖22, and g1(θ) = 10−5θ⊤θ. The
first data owner is assumed to possess the first n1 entries
of the dataset. The second data owner owns entries ranging
from n1 + 1 to n1 + n2. Finally, the third data owner has
access to entries between n1 + n2 + 1 to n1 + n2 + n3 as its
private dataset.
We start with demonstrating the convergence of Algo-
rithm 1 when n1 = n2 = n3 = 250, 000. Figure 2 illustrates
the percentile statistics of the relative fitness ψ(θL,k) for 100
runs of Algorithm 1 versus the iteration number k for the
learning horizon T = 1, 000. Note that, in Algorithm 1, only
one of the data owners communicates with the learner in
each iteration. Figure 3 illustrates an example of communi-
cation timing for the asynchronous learning in Algorithm 1,
illustrating ik versus the iteration number k. Recalling the
stochastic nature of the algorithm, due to the DP noise in
query responses, the relative fitness varies for each run of
the algorithm. The gray area in Figure 2 shows 25%–75%
percentiles of the relative fitness. The black solid lines in
Figure 2 shows the median of relative fitness versus the
iteration number. The median decreases across time until
the algorithm converges to a neighbourhood of the solution
of (1). The relative fitness of the trained model also improves
as ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 increases. Note that smaller privacy budgets
also increase the variations in the relative fitness (i.e., larger
gray area).
Figure 4 illustrates the average relative fitness of the
trained ML model using Algorithm 1 after T = 1, 000 it-
erations, E{ψ(θL,T )}, versus the size of the private datasets
n1 = n2 = n3 and the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. The
mesh surface shows the bound in (11) with c¯′1 = 0 and
c¯′2 = 2.1 × 109. This figure clearly shows the tightness
of the result of Theorem 2. Note that, as expected, the
relative fitness rapidly improves as the sizes of the datasets
n1 = n2 = n3 or the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 increase.
Let us isolate the effects of the size of the datasets
and the privacy budgets. Figure 5 shows the average rel-
ative fitness of the trained ML model using Algorithm 1
after T = 1, 000 iterations, E{ψ(θL,T )}, versus the privacy
budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 [top] and the size of the datasets
n1 = n2 = n3 [bottom]. In this figure, the markers (i.e., ,
, and ) are from the experiments and the solid show the
bound in (11). For both these cases, the bounds in Theorem 2
are tight fits. Therefore, the theoretical results in Theorem 2
match the experiments.
Let us also demonstrate the value of collaboration be-
tween among many banks. Consider an experiment with
61
2
3
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Fig. 3. Example of communication timing for the asynchronous learning in Algorithm 1 for learning lending-interest-rates, illustrating ik versus the
iteration number k.
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Fig. 4. Relative fitness of Algorithm 1 for learning lending-interest-rates
after T = 1, 000 iterations versus the size of the datasets n1 = n2 = n3
and the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. The mesh surface illustrates the
bound in (11) with c¯′
1
= 0 and c¯′
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= 2.1× 109 .
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3
E
{
ψ
(θ
L
,T
)}
n1 = n2 = n3
E
{
ψ
(θ
L
,T
)}
Fig. 5. Relative fitness of Algorithm 1 for learning lending-interest-rates
after T = 1, 000 iterations versus the privacy budget [top] and the size
of the datasets [bottom]. The solid line illustrates the bound in (11) with
c¯′
1
= 0 and c¯′
2
= 2.1× 109 .
N banks each with ni = 10, 000 records collaborating to
train a regression model. Figure 6 shows the average relative
fitness of Algorithm 1 for learning lending-interest-rates
after T = 1, 000 iterations, E{ψ(θL,T )}, versus the privacy
budgets ǫi, ∀i, and the number of the collaborating data
owners N . The solid gray surface shows the relative fitness
of the non-private ML model θ∗1 , ψ(θ
∗
1), constructed based
E
{
ψ
(θ
L
,T
)}
an
d
ψ
(θ
∗ 1
)
N
ǫi , ∀i
Fig. 6. Relative fitness of Algorithm 1 for learning lending-interest-rates
after T = 1, 000 iterations, E{ψ(θL,T )}, versus the privacy budgets
ǫi, ∀i, and the number of collaborating data owners N . The solid gray
surface shows the relative fitness of the non-private ML model θ∗
1
, ψ(θ∗
1
),
constructed based on only the private data of the first data owner. If
the relative fitness of Algorithm 1 is smaller than the relative fitness of
the non-private ML model θ∗
1
, collaboration benefits the first data owner
(illustrated by the black region at the bottom of the figure).
on only the private data of the first data owner. Note that
ψ(θ∗1) is not random (as its construction does not require
DP noise) and is not a function of ǫi. If the relative fitness
of Algorithm 1 is smaller than the relative fitness of the non-
private ML model θ∗1 , collaboration benefits the first data
owner, which is illustrated by the black region at the bottom
of the figure. Evidently, the first data owner benefits from
collaboration if there are more than 5 data owners with
privacy budgets greater than or equal to 10 or if there are
more than 100 data owners with privacy budgets greater
than or equal to 2.5.
5.2 Health-related Data
Now, we use the hospital admission and discharge dataset
from the New York State to validate the theoretical results.
5.2.1 Dataset Description and Pre-Processing
The dataset contains hospital visit and discharge informa-
tion from nearly 2,350,000 de-identified patients including
information, such as characteristics, diagnoses, treatments,
services, and charges. This dataset is made public by the Bu-
reau of Health Informatics [34]. We train a linear regression
model, as in the previous subsection, with inputs, such as
age, gender, race, ethnicity, diagnosis code, procedure code,
and drug code, to automatically determine the length of stay.
This can be used as a tool for determining the capacity of
hospitals in the future based on currently admitted patients.
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Fig. 7. Relative fitness of Algorithm 1 for learning length of stay at
hospital after T = 1, 000 iterations, E{ψ(θL,T )}, for three choices of
privacy budgets ǫi = 0.1 (black line), ǫi = 1 (dashed line), ǫi = 10 (dash-
dotted line). The markers show the relative fitness of the non-private ML
model θ∗i , ψ(θ
∗
i ), constructed based on only the private data of the i-th
data owner versus the size of the data set owned by the i-th data owner.
For ǫ = 10, eight hospitals benefit from collaboration. The relative fitness
of the non-private ML model θ∗i for these eight hospitals are above the
dash-dotted line.
Similarly, we encode categorical attributes, such as gender
and ethnicity, with integer numbers. We also remove at-
tributes, such as total charges and costs, as well as irrelevant
attributes, such as the postcode. Similar to the lending data,
in order to improve the numerical stability of the algorithm,
we perform the PCA to balance the features. We do so based
on the last fifty-thousand entries of the dataset to ensure that
the feature selection does not violate the distributed nature
of the algorithm.
5.2.2 Experiment Setup and Results
The data in [34] is tagged by the hospital name and code.
There are 213 hospitals in the dataset. We focus on 86
hospital with at least 10,000 records. Experiments on the
convergence of the algorithms and the tightness of theoreti-
cal bounds are similar to the lending data and are therefore
eliminated due to space constraints. They are however pre-
sented as supplementary material.
Figure 7 illustrates the relative fitness of Algorithm 1
for learning length of stay at hospital after T = 1, 000
iterations, E{ψ(θL,T )}, for three choices of privacy budgets
ǫi = 0.1 (black line), ǫi = 1 (dashed line), ǫi = 10 (dash-
dotted line). The markers show the relative fitness of the
non-private ML model θ∗i , ψ(θ
∗
i ), constructed based on only
the private data of the i-th data owner versus the size of the
data set owned by the i-th data owner. For ǫ = 10, eight
hospitals (i.e., Women And Children’s Hospital Of Buffalo,
Crouse Hospital, St Peters Hospital, White Plains Hospital
Center, Westchester Medical Center, Memorial Hospital for
Cancer and Allied Diseases, Long Island Jewish Schneiders
Children’s Hospital Division, St Francis Hospital) benefit
from collaboration. The relative fitness of the non-private
ML model θ∗i for these eight hospitals are above the dash-
dotted line.
We demonstrate the performance of the iterates of Algo-
rithm 1. Figure 8 illustrates the percentile statistics of the
k
ψ
(θ
)
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 0.1
k
ψ
(θ
)
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 1.0
k
ψ
(θ
)
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 10
Fig. 8. Percentile statistics of relative fitness of 100 runs of Algorithm 1
for learning length of stay at hospital versus the iteration number k for
a learning horizon of T = 1, 000 iterations with three choices of privacy
budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. The gray area illustrates the range of 25% to 75%
percentiles for the relative fitness and the black line shows the median
of relative fitness.
relative fitness ψ(θL,k) for 100 runs of Algorithm 1 versus
the iteration number k for the learning horizon T = 1, 000.
Figure 9 illustrates an example of communication timing
for the asynchronous learning in Algorithm 1, illustrating
ik versus the iteration number k. At each iteration, only
one of the 86 data owners communicates with the learner.
The gray area in Figure 8 shows 25%–75% percentiles of
the relative fitness and the black solid lines in show the
median of relative fitness versus the iteration number. For
large privacy budgets, the median decreases across time
until the algorithm converges to a neighbourhood of the
solution of (1). The relative fitness of the trained model also
improves as ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 increases.
Figure 10 shows the average relative fitness of the trained
ML model using Algorithm 1 after T = 1, 000 iterations,
E{ψ(θL,T )}, versus the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3.
The markers (i.e., ) show the experiments. Evidently, the
relative fitness rapidly improves as the privacy budgets
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 increase.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we developed an asynchronous DP algorithm
for training ML models on multiple private datasets. We
80
50
100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
k
i k
Fig. 9. Example of communication timing for the asynchronous learning in Algorithm 1 for learning length of stay at hospital, illustrating ik versus
the iteration number k.
ǫi, ∀i
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)}
Fig. 10. Relative fitness of Algorithm 1 for learning length of stay at
hospital after T = 1, 000 iterations versus the privacy budget ǫi, ∀i. The
solid line illustrates the bound in (11) with c¯′
1
= 0.9 and c¯′
2
= 0.6.
proved that, by following the asynchronous algorithm, the
cost of privacy is inversely proportional to the combined
size of the training datasets squared and the privacy bud-
gets squared. Finally, we validated the theoretical results
on experiments on financial data. Future work can focus
on multiple directions. An interesting extension is to con-
sider multiple learners training separate ML models. This
would be more similar to the distributed ML on arbitrary
connected graphs. This way, we can extend the results to
more general communication structures with the learner not
necessarily at the center. We can investigate the behaviour
of private data owners and learners in a data market.
The cost of privacy in this paper can be used as a guide
for developing compensation mechanisms for private data
owners to increase their privacy budgets. The developed
algorithm is particularly of use as the data owners and the
learners in the data market can predict the performance of
privately-trained ML models during negotiation for setting
privacy budgets and compensating data owners. Finally,
we can extend the results to adversarial ML with more
sophisticated adversaries.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since there are at most T rounds of communication, the
privacy budget in each step should be set as ǫi/T for all
i. Now, note that
‖Qik(Dik ; θ¯k)−Qik(D′ik ; θ¯k)‖1
=
1
nik
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
{x,y}∈Dik
∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y)
−
∑
{x,y}∈D′ik
∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
1
nik
∥∥∥∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y)|{x,y}∈Dik\D′ik
−∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y)|{x,y}∈D′
ik
\Dik
∥∥∥
1
=
2Ξ
nik
.
Therefore, the scale of the noise must be 2ΞT/(nikǫik).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We start by casting the problem of privacy-aware learning
in the framework of asynchronous distributed optimiza-
tion in [24]. For any η < 1/N , we can define fi(θ) =
ηg(θ) + 1
n
∑
{x,y}∈Di
ℓ(M(x; θ), y), ∀i ∈ N , and fL(θ) =
(1 − ηN)g(θ). We can think of fi as the cost functions of
data owners and fL as the cost function of the learner. By
construct, fL is σL strongly convex with σL = (1 − ηN)σ
and fi is σi strongly convex with σi = ησ. Note that
‖∇θfi(θ)‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥η∇θg(θ) +
1
n
∑
{x,y}∈Di
∇θℓ(M(x; θ), y)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ηΞg + ni
n
Ξ
≤Ξg + Ξ,
and ‖∇θfL(θ)‖2 = ‖(1− ηN)∇θg(θ)‖ ≤ (1− ηN)Ξg ≤ Ξg.
Therefore, ‖∇θfi(θ)‖2 ≤ C, ∀i, and ‖∇θfL(θ)‖2 ≤ C with
C = Ξg + Ξ.
In each iteration, one of the data owners at random is
selected and follows the gossip algorithm (see [24]) for ex-
changing information in learning and updating the decision
variables. In this paper, however, we assume that the learner
takes care of all the updates and storing the iterates. There-
fore, the learner submits a gradient query to the selected
data owner and receives a DP response for updating the
decision variables. Let i denote the index of the randomly-
selected data owner at iteration k; note that ik is used in
Algorithm 1 for denoting the index. We use G = (V , E) to
denote a graph with the vertex set V = {1, . . . , N,N + 1},
in which node N + 1 is the learner L, and the edge set
E ⊆ V × V . By the methodology of [24], we get
Wk = I − 1
2
(ei − eN+1)(ei − eN+1)⊤,
andUk = {L, i}. It is evident that the probability of selecting
the learner at each round is equal to one, i.e., γL = 1, and
the probability of selecting any data owner is γi = 1/N in
the notation of [24],. We get
W = E{Wk}
= I −


1
2N
0 · · · 0 − 1
2N
0
1
2N
· · · 0 − 1
2N
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1
2N
1
2N
− 1
2N
− 1
2N
· · · − 1
2N
1
2


.
We meet all the conditions of Assumption 2 in [24]. Further-
more, using Theorem 1 in [24], we can see that
λ =
∥∥∥∥Wk − 1N + 111⊤Wk
∥∥∥∥
2
2
< 1.
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The updates in (2) in [24] can be rewritten as
θ¯k =
1
2
θL,k−1 +
1
2
θi,k−1,
with the notation substitution of θ¯k instead of vi,k = vL,k,
θi,k instead of xi,k , and θL,k instead of xL,k. The updates in
(3) in [24] can also be rewritten as
θi,k =ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − αiη∇θg(vk) + αini
n
Qi(θ¯k; k)
]
=ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − αi
(
η∇θg(vk) + ni
n
(Qi(θ¯k; k) + wi(k)))]
=ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − αi(∇θfi(θ¯k) + w¯i(k))
]
,
with w¯i(k) = wi(k)ni/n and
θL,k =ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − αL∇fL(θ¯k)
]
=ΠΘ
[
θ¯k − (1− ηN)αL∇θg(θ¯k)
]
,
where wi(k) is the additive i.i.d. DP noise and
Qi(θ¯k; k) = 1
ni
∑
{x,y}∈Di
∇θℓ(M(x; θ¯k), y).
Note that, here, we are using i instead of ik to reduce
the complexity of the notation and for conforming to the
notation of [24]. We have
E{w¯i(k)|Fk} = 0,
E{‖w¯i(k)‖22|Fk} ≤ ν2i ,
where Fk is the filtration generated by the entire history of
Algorithm 1 up to iteration k. Using Theorem 1, we can see
that
νi =
2
√
2ΞT
nǫi
.
Extending Lemma 3 in [24] results in
E{‖∇θfi(θ¯k) + wi(k)‖22|Fk−1,Wk} ≤ C2 + ν2i ≤ (C + νi)2,
E{‖∇θfL(θ¯k)‖22|Fk−1,Wk} ≤ C2.
Therefore, we can upgrade the right-hand side of (22) in [24]
to
E{α2i (C + νi)2}+ α2LC2 = α2LC2 +
1
N
∑
i∈N
α2i (C + νi)
2
Note that, in the case of this paper, the summation only con-
tains two terms because, in each iteration, only the learner
and another data owner update their decision variables.
This implies that, in Proposition 1 in [24], εnet must be
updated to
εnet =
C
√
N + 1
1−√λ
√
α2L +
1
N
∑
i∈N
α2i
(
1 +
νi
C
)2
.
With the same line of reasoning, we can improve the bound
in Proposition 2 in [24] to get
lim sup
k→∞
[
E{‖θL,k − θ∗‖22}+
∑
i∈N
E{‖θi,k − θ∗‖22}
]
≤ ε+ 2αmaxCεnet
1− q , (12)
where
ε =2(N + 1)(1− γmin)δα,σ diam(Θ)2
2(N + 1)δα,γC diam(Θ)
+ C2
(
α2L +
1
N
∑
i∈N
α2i
(
1 +
νi
C
)2 )
, (13)
and
αmax =max
i
αi,
γmin =1/N,
q =1− 2γminmin
{
αLσL,min
i∈N
αiσi
}
,
δα,σ =max
{
αLσL,max
i∈N
αiσi
}
−min
{
αLσL,min
i∈N
αiσi
}
,
δα,γ =max
{
αLγL,max
i∈N
αiγi
}
−min
{
αLγL,min
i∈N
αiγi
}
.
Therefore, for any ς > 0, there exists large enough T ∈ N
such that[
E{‖θL,T − θ∗‖22}+
∑
i∈N
E{‖θi,T − θ∗‖22}
]
≤ ς + ε+ 2αmaxCεnet
1− q , (14)
Selecting η = 1/(2N) and αL = αi/N = α/σ for some
constant α ∈ (0, 1), we get δα,σ = δα,γ = 0. Therefore, we
can simplify (13) to get
ε =
α2C2
σ2
(
1 +N
∑
i∈N
(
1 +
νi
C
)2 )
. (15)
We will also get
2αmaxCεnet =
2Nα2C2
√
N + 1
σ2(1−√λ)
×
√
1 +N
∑
i∈N
(
1 +
νi
C
)2
. (16)
Furthermore,
1− q = 2γminmin
{
αLσL,min
i∈N
αiσi
}
=
α
N
. (17)
Combining (14) with (15)–(17), we get
E{‖θL,T − θ∗‖22}
≤
[
E{‖θL,T − θ∗‖22}+
∑
i∈N
E{‖θi,T − θ∗‖22}
]
≤NαC
2
σ2

1 +N ∑
i∈N
(
1 +
2
√
2ΞT
nǫi(Ξg + Ξ)
)2
+
2N2αC2
√
N + 1
σ2(1−√λ)
√√√√1+N∑
i∈N
(
1+
2
√
2ΞT
nǫi(Ξg + Ξ)
)2
.
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Define c1 = NC
2/σ2, c2 = 2N
2C2
√
N + 1/(σ2(1 −√λ)).
We have
E{‖θL,T − θ∗‖22}
≤c1α

1+N ∑
i∈N
(
1 +
2
√
2ΞT
nǫi(Ξg + Ξ)
)2
+ c2α
√√√√1+N ∑
i∈N
(
1 +
2
√
2ΞT
nǫi(Ξg + Ξ)
)2
.
Selecting α = ρ/T 2 and noting that Ξ ≤ Ξg + Ξ, the upper
bound can be further simplified (8). Following the same
modifications in the proof of Proposition 3 in [24] results
in (9).
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